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Abstract 
Advance pricing arrangement (“APA”) becomes a common tool to attract 
foreign investors to carry out their business in the Member States’ territory. 
The advantage of APA which providing legitimate expectations to the 
taxpayers is one of the reasons of why the companies file an APA request to 
the tax authorities.  
However, APAs are not free from issues or problems arose, especially in 
relation to the disruption of the harmony in the internal market within the 
European Union (“EU”). The unilateral APA will become a problem when 
it is implemented in the unlawful way and receives preferential tax 
treatment that may lead to the state aid infringement in the meaning of EU 
rules.  
Yet, this matter could be solved by increasing the tax transparency which 
unilateral APAs are lack of. Thus, in order to answer the critical needs for 
tax transparency, the European Commission published the tax transparency 
package on 18 March 2015 as a proposal to introduce a quarter basis of 
automatically exchanging information in terms of Member State’s cross-
border tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements. 
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This research thesis aims to answer the concerns that arise with regard to the 
APAs framework. I am happy and thankful that the Republic of Indonesia 
granted me the possibility to participate in one of the most valued 
programmes globally concerning international tax law. 
In particular, I would like to thank my beloved family and friends in 
supporting me throughout this quest; with my special thanks go to Caroline 
Silalahi and Merijn de Beer, for their advice and encouragement during my 
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Abbreviation list 
 
 
 
  
Aiki LP Alki Limited Partnership 
Amazon EU Sarl Amazon EU Société à responsabilité limitée 
APA Advance Pricing Arrangement 
BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Closed CV Closed Dutch limited partnership 
CSA Cost-sharing arrangement 
EC European Commission 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EMEA Europe, Middle East and Africa 
EU European Union 
FFT Fiat Finance and Trade Ltd 
IP Intellectual property 
Lux SCS Amazon Europe Technologies Holding SCS 
MAP APA Advance Pricing Arrangement under the 
Mutual Agreement Procedure 
OECD Model Tax 
Convention 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and Capital 
SGI Société de Gestion Industrielle SA 
SIAT Société d’investissement pour l’agriculture 
tropicale SA 
Starbucks BV Starbucks Coffee EMEA B.V. 
Starbucks Manufacturing Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA B.V. 
TFEU 
 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Tax transparency has become one of the major solutions to tackle harmful 
tax competition. In order to answer to the increasing need for tax 
transparency, the European Commission (“EC”) published the tax 
transparency package on 18 March 2015, as a proposal to introduce a 
quarter basis of automatically exchanging information between Member 
States. This was done in coherence with their cross-border tax rulings and 
advance pricing arrangements (“APA”).1 
When looking at the APAs, there have been numerous state aid proceedings 
that attracted the attention of the EC which responded by starting an in-
depth investigation concerning the individual tax rulings issued by some 
Member States’ tax authorities – covering some unilateral APAs. Examples 
are the three transfer pricing arrangements that were conducted between the 
Irish tax authorities and Apple, the Dutch tax authorities and Starbucks and 
the Luxembourgish tax authorities and Fiat on 11 June 2014.2 These 
investigations were followed by the proceedings subjected to Amazon in 
Luxembourg on 7 October 2014. The non-transparent individual tax rulings 
published by several Member States to certain taxpayers may involve 
European Union (“EU”) state aid rules since the counterpart tax 
jurisdictions would experience the disadvantage by reason of the particular 
taxpayers could possibly undervalue their taxable profit in the local tax 
jurisdiction.3 
Following the statements of the Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis who is 
responsible for the Euro and Social Dialogue, “Everyone has to pay their 
fair share of tax. This applies to multinationals as to everyone else. With 
today’s proposal on the automatic exchange of information, tax authorities 
would be able to better identify loopholes or duplication of tax between 
Member States. In the coming months, we will put forward concrete actions 
to tackle such loopholes or overlaps. We are committed to following up on 
our promises with real, credible and fair action”4, the EC amended the 
Directive on Administration Cooperation5 and resulted in adoption of the 
regulation by the Council in December 2014 to ‘ensure that the EU has a 
                                                
1 European Commission Press Release, Combating corporate tax avoidance: Commission 
presents Tax Transparency Package, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
4610_en.htm as accessed on 3 May 2015. 
2 http://www.stateaidlaw.eu/46_193_news_2716.php as accessed on 14 May 2015. 
3 European Commission Press Release, State aid: Commission investigates transfer pricing 
arrangements on corporate taxation of Amazon in Luxembourg, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1105_en.htm as accessed on 14 May 2015.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Council Directive 2014/107/EU amending Directive 2011/16/EU. 
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solid legislative framework for the automatic exchange of information and 
spells the definitive end of bank secrecy for tax purposes across the EU’6. 
This amendment is considered as a significant achievement in increasing the 
tax transparency within the EU. 
These concrete steps by the EC are in line with the Action Plan 13 of 
Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development’s (“OECD”) 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project, which was delivered on 
September 2014. Action Plan 13 which was named “Guidance on Transfer 
Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting” provides a 
standardized structure for transfer pricing documentation and a guidance for 
three documents that should be produced by the taxpayers. Those 
documents comprise of a  master file, a local file and a country-by-country 
report.7 These actions are essential to tackle the BEPS issue by ‘providing 
tax administrations with adequate information to conduct transfer pricing 
risk assessments and examinations’ as a part of  the structural increase of tax 
transparency. 
APA itself, which is initiated by the request from taxpayers, has three 
different types i.e. unilateral, bilateral and multilateral APAs. Dissimilar to 
bilateral and multilateral APAs, unilateral APAs cannot eliminate either the 
juridical or economic double or non-taxation since not all relevant countries 
participate to produce the unilateral APAs.8 This results in the issue that 
Unilateral APAs may create significant problems to both tax administrations 
and taxpayers since the other tax jurisdictions may have a different 
judgement with regard to the transfer pricing methods or range of acceptable 
pricing that was concluded in the APA.9 
The matter of unilateral APAs is not only with respect to the tax 
transparency, as explained in the abovementioned. One of the objectives to 
obtain APAs is increasing the legitimate expectations between taxpayers 
and tax administrations. Yet, due to the exclusion of other tax authorities 
from which the transactions are covered by the APA, the legitimate 
expectations that should be provided by the unilateral APAs will have no 
influence since the counterpart party is not bound by such an APA. Thus, 
the taxpayers will lose their advantage of the legitimate expectations even 
though they have obtained the unilateral APAs.  
                                                
6 European Commission, Communication from the commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on tax transparency to fight evasion and avoidance, p. 3. 
7 OECD (2014), Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264219236-en, p. 9. 
8 OECD (July 2010), OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations (“OECD Guidelines”), OECD Publishing, para. 4.145. 
9 See para. 4.147 and 4.148 of the OECD Guidelines. 
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When addressing the needs to increase the legitimate expectations level 
through APAs, the legal certainty principle is a fundamental principle in the 
EU law ‘which requires the law to be clear, easily accessible, 
comprehensible, prospective rather than retrospective and relatively 
stable.’10  However, APA is not considered as a law but an agreement or 
contract, since APA is executed based on the factual information provided 
by the taxpayers to the competent authorities. Thus, APA is not an 
interpretation of the law where the legal certainty principle applies. Yet, 
APA itself has the legal consequences when it is executed not in accordance 
with the EU law. This means that obtaining APA may breach EU law, 
which in this case is the EU state aid rules.  
1.2 Aim 
With a view of the background presented, the purpose of this thesis is to 
examine whether the unilateral APAs include a risk of infringing the EU 
law. The unilateral APAs that are granted inappropriately with its aim to 
increase the level of legitimate expectations for the taxpayers may lead to 
the breach of EU state aid rules. Also, the non-transparent unilateral APAs 
to the other tax jurisdictions may result to the harmful tax competition 
between Member States since the other counterpart parties do not aware 
with the APAs’ presence.  
This thesis will as well provide the solutions to overcome the issues 
mentioned above for unilateral APAs.  
1.3 Method and material 
The methodologies used for this thesis are to take the on going issues that 
the EC investigated in the state aid reviews and fetch support in the several 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) cases law. In order to have a better 
understanding with regard to APAs, the OECD Model Convention and the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (“OECD Guidelines”) have been used extensively in this 
study. 
1.4 Delimitation 
From a geographical perspective, the APA issues will be limited to the 
member states that enforce unilateral APAs within the EU. The issues 
analysed will be only limited to the state aid proceedings and several 
relevant ECJ case law. The understanding of APAs is based on the OECD 
Model Tax Convention and OECD Guidelines in accordance to the transfer 
pricing issues. 
                                                
10 Dennis Weber and Thidaporn Sirithaporn, Legal Certainty, Legitimate Expectations, 
Legislative Drafting, Harmonization and Legal Enforcement in EU Tax Law, p. 235. 
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1.5 Outline 
This research is structured in different sections. A description of the 
problem area will be given in the introduction chapter, pointing out the 
feasibility of the study. Furthermore, the purpose and delimitations will 
describe the scope and motivation for the study.  
Chapter two will introduce and define the legal phenomenon known as 
APAs, followed by an extensive description of state aid proceedings in 
chapter three. Chapter four discusses the ECJ case law and its relation to the 
APAs and tax low regimes. The following chapter explains the legality 
issues in relation to the APA. Chapter six explains about the today’s tax 
transparency package which it will help to increase the level of legitimate 
expectations for the taxpayers while obtaining the unilateral APAs. 
Concluding remarks will be made in chapter seven, wherein the findings of 
the study are presented.  
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2. An introduction to APA 
2.1 Understanding the APA 
The OECD Guidelines describes APA as: 
“An arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an 
appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate 
adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed 
period of time”.11  
The controlled transactions in the description above indicate that the 
transactions occur between two or more entities which have a special 
relationship with one another. APA could also be interpreted as  
“A procedural arrangement between a taxpayer or taxpayers and a tax 
administration intended to resolve potential transfer pricing disputes in 
advance”.12 
There are three different types of APAs, which are defined as unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral APAs. An extensive description is given in the next 
paragraph: 
The arrangements that are conducted solely between a taxpayer and a tax 
administration under the domestic law and jurisdiction ‘without the 
involvement of other interested tax administrations’ refer to unilateral 
APAs.13 Unilateral APAs have some advantages such as (1) providing 
certainty to the taxpayer for the ‘specified period of time’, (2) more 
simplified procedures to acquire the APA compare to bilateral and 
multilateral APAs, (3) and it decreases the time and cost in case of tax audit 
to the bare minimum level.14 However, the unilateral APAs do not prevent 
the double taxation by the reason of the other tax jurisdiction is not directly 
involved and might disagree with the APA’s conclusion.15 This situation 
could emerge when the taxpayer over-allocates income ‘in order to avoid 
lengthy and expensive transfer pricing enquiries or excessive penalties’ in 
which the APA is concluded. It could therefore shift its administrative 
burden to the other tax jurisdiction.16 This means that the legitimate 
expectations that were designed to be the advantage for the taxpayer in the 
                                                
11 See para. 4.123 of the OECD Guidelines. 
12 See para. 3 of the annex to Chapter 4 of the OECD Guidelines. 
13 See para. 4.129 and para. 5 of the annex to Chapter 4 of the OECD Guidelines. 
14 See para. 4.142 of the OECD Guidelines and Ina Kerschner and Marion Stiastny, The 
Experience with Advance Pricing Agreements, Intertax Vol. 41 Issue 11, Kluwer Law 
International BV p. 588. 
15 See para. 4.147 of the OECD Guidelines. 
16 Ibid. 
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country in which APA is concluded, will lead to much less valuable when 
the APA is proved as inconsistent to the arm’s-length principle. As the 
OECD states, the unilateral APAs may create significant problems to both 
tax administrations and taxpayers since the other tax jurisdiction may have a 
different judgement with regard to the transfer pricing methods or range of 
permissible pricing that was concluded in the APA.17 
Bilateral APA is a ‘single mutual agreement between the competent 
authorities of two tax administrations under the relevant party’. Multilateral 
APA is the occurrence of more than one bilateral mutual agreement which 
consists of tax authorities from more than two countries.18 Both bilateral and 
multilateral APAs are invoked to advance pricing arrangements under the 
mutual agreement procedure (“MAP APAs”), which is considered to be 
within the scope of article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (“OECD Model Tax Convention”) i.e. the mutual 
agreement procedure. In paragraph 3 of the article, it states that: 
“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavour to 
resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the 
interpretation or application of the Convention. They may consult together 
for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in the 
Convention.”19 
One of the main objectives of APAs is to reduce the risk of double taxation, 
hence seeing the above-mentioned paragraph, it is considered that ‘APAs 
are authorised by paragraph 3 of article 25 because the specific transfer 
pricing cases subject to an APA are not otherwise provided in the 
Convention’.20 It is in accordance with the facts that bilateral or multilateral 
APAs provide greater level of legitimate expectations for both taxpayers 
and tax administrations than Unilateral APAs. However the costs combined 
with time-consuming procedures to obtain such APAs are generally much 
more higher and longer than Unilateral APAs.21 
  
                                                
17 See para. 4.147 and 4.148 of the OECD Guidelines. 
18 See para. 5 of the annex to Chapter 4 of the OECD Guidelines. 
19 See para. 3 of the art. 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
20 See para. 4.139 of the OECD Guidelines. 
21 See para. 4.145 and 4.158 of the OECD Guidelines. 
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3. State aid rule and APAs 
proceedings in the EU 
3.1 State aid rule in the EU law 
The commissioner for Taxation, Algirdas Šemeta, stated in the press release 
on 11 June 2014 that: 
“Fair tax competition is essential for the integrity of the Single Market, for 
the fiscal sustainability of our Member States, and for a level-playing field 
between our businesses. Our social and economic model relies on it, so we 
must do all we can do to defend it.”22  
The general rule of State Aid is incompatible with the internal market. 
However there are some justifications and measures which can be applied to 
permit the State Aid and allow it to be compatible to the internal market, 
such as stated in the Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU, de minimis aid and the 
General Block Exemption Regulation.  
In order for a measure to be qualified as State Aid, all conditions stemming 
from Article 107 (1) TFEU must be fulfilled: 
a. Aid granted by a Member State or through State resources;  
b. Selective economic advantage;  
c. Distortion of competition; and  
d. Affectation of trade between Member States.  
The selectivity advantage factor is assumed to be the main measurement to 
determine ‘whether there is a specific target group that benefits from the 
measure whilst other economic agents do not’.23 Thus, the selectivity test, 
which consists of three steps, is performed to differentiate between ‘general 
economic measures and selective measures’, as follows: 
a. ‘The ‘common’ or ‘normal’ tax system of Member States should be 
recognized; 
b. Determine whether the tax measure at issue grants an advantageous 
deviation from the ‘normal’ tax system; and 
                                                
22 European Commission Press Release, State aid: Commission investigates transfer 
pricing arrangements on corporate taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks 
(Netherlands) and Fiat Finance and Trade (Luxembourg), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-663_en.htm 
as accessed on 17 March 2015. 
23 M. Lang, P.Pistone, J. Schuch and C. Staringer, Introduction to European Tax Law on 
Direct Taxation, 3rd edition, Linde, p. 109. 
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c. Examine whether the exception to the system or differentiation 
within the system may be justified by the nature or general scheme 
of the tax system.’24 
 
3.2 APAs proceedings in the EU 
The following proceedings are the state aid reviews which drew the 
attention of the EC and thus opened the in-depth investigation to examine 
whether those Member States comply with the EU rules on state aid. These 
proceedings have to deal with the tax rulings on transfer pricing 
arrangements between the competent authorities and taxpayer(s) that 
involve state aid within the meaning of EU rules. 
• Amazon (SA.38944) 
Amazon filed an APA request to the Luxembourgish tax authorities on 
23 October 2003 with regard to the royalty pricing arrangement 
between Amazon Europe Technologies Holding SCS (“Lux SCS”) 
and Amazon EU Société à responsabilité limitée (“Amazon EU Sarl”). 
The tax authorities approved the request on 6 November 2003, which 
was only 11 working days from the date that Amazon submitted the 
letter and remained valid for the next 10 years. The EU Commission 
investigated if the transfer pricing arrangements on corporate taxation 
of Amazon in Luxembourg were complying with the EU rules on state 
aid.25  
Amazon.com Inc entered into a cost-sharing arrangement (“CSA”) 
with its Luxembourg affiliate, Lux SCS, where it was entitled to 
exploit the intangibles in Europe.26 Because of the buy-in license and 
cost-sharing agreement, Lux SCS could consequently license the 
Amazon group’s intellectual property (“IP”) rights to Amazon EU 
Sarl, a Luxembourg commercial company which functions as the head 
office of Amazon in Europe, to run the European websites.27 Amazon 
EU Sarl itself holds all the shares in the EU Marketing subsidiaries 
outside Luxembourg, either direct or indirect.28  
In the APA request letter dated 23 October 2003, Amazon presented 
the economic analysis of functions and risks that would be borne by 
                                                
24 M. Lang, op.cit., p. 110. 
25 European Commission Press Release, State aid: Commission investigates transfer 
pricing arrangements on corporate taxation of Amazon in Luxembourg, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1105_en.htm as accessed on 23 February 
2015. 
26 Lowell D. Yoder, Recent Transfer Pricing Cases, International Tax Journal 
(September-October 2014), CCH Wolters Kluwer, p. 3. 
27 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 18 and 19. 
28 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembour, op.cit., para. 31. 
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Amazon EU Sarl and the determination of the royalty calculation 
based on the analysis.29 However, the Luxembourgish tax authorities 
did not submit the copy of the analysis to the EC. As stated in the 
letter, the determination of royalty rate and payment from Amazon EU 
Sarl to Lux SCS was as follows: 
“1) Compute and allocate to Amazon EU Sarl the “Amazon EU Sarl 
Return”, which is equal to the lesser of (a) [4-6] % of Amazon EU 
Sarl’s total EU Operating Expenses for the year and (b) total EU 
Operating Profit attributable to the European Web Sites for such 
year;  
(2) The Licence Fee shall be equal to EU Operating Profit minus the 
Amazon EU Sarl Return, provided that the License Fee shall not be 
less than zero.   
(3) The Royalty Rate for the year shall be equal to the License Fee 
divided by total EU Revenue for the year.   
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the amount of the Amazon EU Sarl 
Return for any year shall not be less than 0.45% of EU Revenue, nor 
greater than 0.55% of EU Revenue.   
(5) (a) In the event that the Amazon EU Sarl Return determined under 
step (1) would be less than 0.45% of EU Revenues, the Amazon EU 
Sarl Return shall be adjusted to equal the lesser of (i) 0.45% of 
Revenue or EU Operating Profit or (ii) EU Operating Profit  (b) In 
the event that the Amazon EU Sarl Return determined under step (1) 
would be greater than 0.55% of EU Revenues, the Amazon EU Sarl 
Return shall be adjusted to equal the lesser of (i) 0.55% of EU 
Revenues or (ii) EU Operating Profit.”30 
As Lux SCS was established as a Luxembourg limited liability 
partnership, it is considered to be a transparent entity for the tax 
purposes in Luxembourg.31 The following figure is the structure of the 
Amazon group companies.32  
                                                
29 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 35. 
30 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 37. 
31 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 39. 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Source:  State aid SA.38944 
In other words, all the royalty payments received from the licensing 
agreement and interest received from intra-group loans by Lux SCS 
would not be taxed in Luxembourg in principle, as it would be taxed 
in the country of residence of the partners in Lux SCS to whom the 
profits were allocated on a yearly basis.33  
The problem became more complicated when Amazon requested 
confirmation from the Luxembourgish tax authorities that no partners 
of Lux SCS or Lux SCS itself have any tangible presence in 
Luxembourg, such as employees or offices.34 While Lux SCS was not 
deemed to be operating through a permanent establishment in 
Luxembourg, the non-resident partners of the Lux SCS or Lux SCS 
itself was not taxed in Luxembourg.35 
In connection to the explanation above, ‘the Commission has concerns 
that the ruling could underestimate the taxable profits of Amazon EU 
Sarl, and thereby grant an economic advantage to Amazon by 
allowing the group to pay less tax than other companies whose profits 
are allocated in line with market terms.’36 The EC argued that 
Luxembourg did not submit a transfer pricing report prepared by 
Amazon as a supporting document to request the APA nor the 
                                                
33 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 39. 
34 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 40. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Press release Luzembourg, op.cit. 
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economic analysis with regard to the functions and risks that Amazon 
EU Sarl was expected to perform. Moreover, as described in the 
definition of royalty rate above, the EC pointed out that the royalty 
payment is a residual profit which means that ‘the royalty will be 
expressed as a percentage of revenues’ instead of being calculated 
based on the revenues.37 That is to say the royalty payment is just a 
predictable number and does not give consideration to the actual 
functions and risks carried out by the company.  
• Starbucks (SA.38374) 
 
The EC investigated APA concluded by the Netherlands with 
Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (“Starbucks Manufacturing”) 
where the Dutch tax authorities agreed to the set-up of the Starbucks 
Dutch companies’ legal structure and the arm’s-length remuneration 
amounts to 9-12 % mark-up on the relevant cost base (which is the 
value added cost).38  
Alki Limited Partnership (“Alki LP”), a UK Limited partnership, 
owns Starbucks BV and gives license of the intellectual property 
rights to Starbucks Coffee EMEA BV (“Starbucks BV”), the head 
office for Europe, Middle East and Africa (“EMEA”) segment.39 
Starbucks BV also has a direct subsidiary, a Dutch company, called 
Starbucks Manufacturing.40 Both of these Dutch companies pay 
royalties to Alki LP in relation to the intangible rights.41 The figure 
below shows the structure of Starbucks group companies.42 
                                                
37 State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) Luxembourg, op.cit., para. 67. 
38 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., para. 17, 30 and 31. 
39 European Commission, State aid SA.38374 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) – 
Netherlands alleged aid to Starbucks, para. 22. 
40 Ibid.  
41 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., para. 22 and 23. 
42 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., p. 9. 
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Source:  State aid SA.38374 
According to Dutch tax law, Alki LP is similar to a closed Dutch 
limited partnership (closed CV), hence it is not liable to corporate 
income tax.43 In other words, the royalty payments made to Alki LP 
are considered as direct payment to Starbucks US from a Dutch tax 
                                                
43 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., para. 28. 
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perspective.44 Also, since Alki LP is a UK limited partnership, the 
company does not have an obligation to file accounts in UK.45 
The problem arose when Starbucks Manufacturing paid the excess 
profit beyond the 9-12% mark-up to Alki LP as a tax deductible 
royalty for ‘manufacturing process patent’ in order to meet the pricing 
agreed in the APA – where the taxable profit should only be on 
position of 9-12% of Starbucks Manufacturing’s operating expenses.46 
This means that the royalty payment made to Alki LP did not reflect 
the value of the IP at all. Because the APA was used to calculate the 
corporate income tax basis of Starbucks Manufacturing and the 
royalty payment also took place on the basis of the APA issued by the 
Dutch tax authorities, the decrease of the taxable basis through the 
royalty expense can be concluded as ‘the APA gives rise to a loss of 
State resources’.47 
• Fiat (SA.38375) 
The Fiat investigation may be the tensest APA proceeding between 
the competent authorities and the EC. Fiat Finance and Trade Ltd 
(“FFT”) requested a transfer pricing arrangement by submitting a 
letter and transfer pricing report as supporting document to 
Luxembourgish tax authorities on 14 March 2012. Tax authorities 
accepted this request on 3 September 2012 by issuing a decision letter 
which was binding for the next five years i.e. from tax year 2012 to 
tax year 2016. However, to obtain all the information needed in order 
to examine whether Luxembourgish tax authorities comply with the 
state aid rules, the EC had to issue an information injunction decision 
which the Luxembourg authorities appealed later on.  
FFT is a treasury and finance company based in Luxembourg which is 
owned by Fiat S.p.A (approximately 40%), the head of Fiat Group 
based in Italy; and Fiat Finance S.p.A. (approximately 60%), a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Fiat S.p.A. Within the Group, Fiat 
centralises its financial and treasury functions, including all funding, 
corporate finance, bank relationship, cash pooling, cash balances 
management, etc. by the treasury companies.48 ‘FFT itself provides 
treasury services and financing to Fiat Group companies based mainly 
in Europe excluding Italy and also manages several cash pool 
                                                
44 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., para. 28. 
45 Ibid. 
46 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., para. 58. 
47 SA.38374 (2014/C) Starbucks, op.cit., para 70 and 71. 
48 European Commission, State aid SA.38375 (2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) – Luxembourg 
alleged aid to FFT, para. 23. 
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structures for the group companies’.49 The following figure shows the 
structure of FFT intra-sector transactions.50 
 
Source: State aid SA.38375 
As seen from the picture above, FFT’s cross-border intra-group 
transactions occur between treasury companies and between the group 
companies. The intercompany transactions are intercompany loans 
and intercompany guarantees on the bonds issued.51 
In the APA agreed by the Luxembourg authorities, the remuneration 
was determined as follows, 
“The transfer pricing study determines an appropriate remuneration 
on the capital at risk and the capital aimed at remunerating the 
functions performed by the company of EUR 2.542 million on which a 
range of +/- 10% is envisaged”52  
where the standard tax rate applied is 28.80% and this remuneration is 
considered arm’s length and will not have any adjustment within the 
five-years period. 
For the purpose of APA, the remuneration for the functions and risks 
performed by FFT is calculated on the basis of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, which is used to determine the arm’s-length margin of 
a net profit indicator i.e. equity. As explained above, the tax base is 
                                                
49 State aid SA.38375 FFT, para. 21. 
50 State aid SA.38375 FFT, para. 23. 
51 State aid SA.38375 FFT, para. 26. 
52 State aid SA.38375 FFT, para. 37. 
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fixed at EUR 2.542 million (+/- 10%) which could be translated to a 
fixed range for taxable basis of 2.288 to 2.796 million.53 This means 
that the tax base is virtually fixed – unless FFT could maintain the 
stable business in the duration of tax ruling which unfortunately there 
is no information about the guarantee or how FFT would achieve the 
stable condition.54 
3.3 Analysis of the APAs proceedings 
As explained in the previous section, one of the main objectives of obtaining 
APAs is to increase the level of legitimate expectations between taxpayers 
and tax administrations. From the above-mentioned proceedings, it is clear 
that the taxpayers expect to ensure their legitimate expectations with respect 
to the tax liability in each Member States. 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention sets the international 
standard of the arm’s-length principle, where the commercial or financial 
relations between two associated enterprises should not differ from those 
which would be made between independent enterprises. However, the APAs 
concluded by the competent authorities and taxpayers in the proceedings 
enclosed show that the arm’s-length principle is infringed and being 
investigated by the EC. 
It is obvious that the taxpayers and parties who are involved and gain the 
advantage from the APAs would never complaint or raise any objections to 
the court or the EC. However, since it is an unilateral APA, the secrecy 
remains in the domestic law and the counterpart tax jurisdictions will have 
difficulties to find out without the exchange of information. Same condition 
goes to the EC. Thus, the unilateral APAs become a new strategy for 
particular taxpayers in certain Member States to avoid tax and harm the tax 
competition which infringes the state aid rules within the EU and the arm’s-
length principle with regard to the transfer pricing issues. At the time when 
the unilateral APAs are not transparent to other relevant tax jurisdictions, 
the APAs have lost the legitimate expectations and will become 
unaccountable.  
As a matter of fact, when the Member States grant the APA request to the 
domestic taxpayers based on purely discretionary exercise of authorization 
as described in the above three state aid proceedings, they are considered as 
providing the selective advantage to a specific companies which constitute 
illegal state aid within the EU.  
                                                
53 State aid SA.38375 FFT, para. 64. 
54 Ibid. 
 22 
 
4. ECJ Case Law 
4.1.1 ECJ case law in relation to APAs 
• SIAT55 
Société d’investissement pour l’agriculture tropicale SA (“SIAT”) is a 
Belgian resident company which established a joint subsidiary with a 
Nigerian group for the production of palm oil.56 Under on the 
agreement the between parties, SIAT has to supply services and sell 
equipment to the joint subsidiary where, as the commission for 
introducing the business, SIAT has to pay a Luxembourg company 
named Megatrade International (the company heading of Nigerian 
Group) a give back part of the profit.57 SIAT recorded the payment of 
commission as business expenses, which was denied by the Belgian 
tax authority. SIAT challenged the decision and the court referred the 
case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, questioning the compatibility 
of the Belgian tax rules with the article 56 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) i.e. freedom to provide 
services.58 
Under the Belgian tax rules, there is a general rule for the domestic 
transactions where the taxpayer has to provide proof of the 
authenticity and amount of the expenditure incurred; and the 
expenditure is necessary for acquiring the taxable income.59  While 
under the special rule, there is a presumption from the beginning that 
the expenses are not deductible ‘unless the Belgian taxpayer provides 
proof that such payments relate to a genuine and proper transaction’.60 
This special rule applies when a tax regime is appreciably more 
advantageous than the applicable regime in Belgium.  
Three possible justifications were argued to the court, stating that it is 
need in order to combat tax avoidance and evasion, balance the 
allocation of taxing powers and ensure the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision. However, the Court stated that the rule does not meet the 
requirement of the principle of legal certainty where the ‘rules of law 
must be clear, precise and predictable as regards their effects, in 
particular where they may have unfavourable consequences for 
individuals and undertakings’, considering that the Belgian tax 
                                                
55 C-318/10, SIAT, 5 July 2012. 
56 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 8. 
57 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 9. 
58 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 14. 
59 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 21. 
60 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 17. 
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authority does not require to provide prima facie evidence of tax 
evasion or avoidance.61 Thus, the rule cannot be considered to be 
proportionate. 
• P Oy62 
P Oy, a company incorporated in Finland, requested to deduct the 
losses incurred between the tax years 1998 and 2004 to the Finnish tax 
authorities on 3 September 2008.63 P Oy changed the ownership 
shares in August 2004. However, the competent tax authorities 
rejected the request considering there were no special reasons to 
justify the grant of authorisation. 
The Finnish law allows the application for a loss carry forward up to 
10 years, unless more than 50% of the company’s shares are 
changed.64 Nevertheless, when it is necessary to change the ownership 
for the purpose of company’s activities named ‘special reasons’, the 
tax authorities may grant the company to deduct the losses.65 
After the rejection, P Oy appealed to the Supreme Administrative 
Court which referred the case for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ 
considering whether the Finnish law constitutes state aid, particularly 
for the criterion of selectivity requirement.66 
Since the law was established before Finland joined the EU on 1995, 
the court decided that it was classified as an existing aid.67 The court 
also stated that in order to identify the selectivity condition, it was 
necessary to examine the reference system, named the ‘normal’ 
system, tax regime in relation to the exception provided by the Finnish 
tax authorities.68 
• Oy AA69 
Oy AA is a Finnish resident company which is owned indirectly 100% 
by AA Ltd, the parent company established in the United Kingdom. 
The indirect subsidiary wants to give a group contribution of its 
profits to AA Ltd, due to its loss in 2003 and it is expected to continue 
the losses in 2004 and 2005. Thus, Oy AA applies for a preliminary 
decision from the Finnish Central Tax Board ‘as to whether the 
                                                
61 C-318/10, SIAT, para. 55 and 58. 
62 C-6/12, P Oy, 18 July 2013. 
63 C-6/12, P Oy, para. 10. 
64 C-6/12, P Oy, para. 4-6. 
65 C-6/12, P Oy, para. 7 and 8. 
66 C-6/12, P Oy, para. 11 
67 C-6/12, P Oy, para. 43. 
68 C-6/12, P Oy, para. 32. 
69 C-231/05, Oy AA, 18 July 2007. 
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transfer envisaged constituted an intra-group financial transfer under 
Finnish law and could therefore be regarded as a tax-deductible 
expense’.70 
The Finnish law itself provides the possibility to gain the tax 
advantage by having a deduction of an intra-group financial transfer if 
the parent company holds at least 90% of the capital or shares of the 
subsidiary. The contribution is tax deductible for the distributor and 
taxable for the recipient. In the case of Oy AA, all requirements for a 
group contribution are met, except for the fact that the recipient of the 
contribution is not resident in Finland. As a consequence, Oy AA 
could not deduct the contribution. Oy AA objects the decision made 
by the Finnish tax authorities and goes to the court by arguing that 
nationality clause conflicted with the free movement of capital and 
freedom of establishment.  
The Member States involved argue for the justification of the 
restriction on freedom of establishment which the ECJ accepted i.e. 
the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of the power to tax 
between Member States, the risk of the losses might be used twice and 
the prevention of tax avoidance.71 
As a conclusion of the court, the ECJ stated that ‘the lack of a cross-
border dimension to the Finnish rules was a proportionate and 
necessary response to the twin problems of not being able to tax the 
profits of group companies arising on its territory and preventing tax 
avoidance through the artificial of profits to other member states to 
achieve a tax saving’.72 
The Oy AA case shows that the protection of balance in the allocation 
of taxing rights between Member States is important to tackle tax 
avoidance involving wholly artificial arrangements.  
• SGI73 
Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (“SGI”) is a holding company 
incorporated under Belgian law which granting an interest-free loan to 
Recydem SA, a company incorporated under French law.74 SGI holds 
65% shares of Recydam SA. While a Luxembourg company, 
                                                
70 European Commission Legal Service, Summaries of important judgments C-231/05 Oy 
AA, judgement of 18 July 2007. 
71 C-231/05, Oy AA, para. 53-58. 
72 Tom O’Shea, News Analysis: Finland’s Intragroup Financial Transfer Rules Compatible 
with EU Law, Tax Notes International Vol 47 No. 7, p.4. 
73 C-311/08, Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI) v. Belgian State, 21 January 2010. 
74 C-311/08, SGI, para. 9. 
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Cobelpin SA, owns 34% shareholding in SGI and also a director and 
managing director of SGI. 
The Belgian authorities challenged the interest-free loan transaction 
from SGI to Recydem SA and added a notional interest of 5% of the 
amount granted back to SGI’s profits, as ruled under the domestic law 
provision.75 Under the Belgian rules, the amount of exceptional or 
gratuitous advantages granted to the non-resident related party will be 
included in the tax base of the Belgian company and taxed 
accordingly.76 In the national court, the matter came considering the 
national provision might be incompatible with the freedom of 
establishment and/or the free movement of capital in the EU. 
Two justifications were scrutinized to accept the restrictions of the 
freedom i.e. the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing 
rights between the Member States and the need to prevent tax 
avoidance.77 
In conclusion, The ECJ stated that the Belgian tax rules at issue were 
proportionate and, ‘subject to verification of the proportionality issue 
by the referring court in Belgium, such rules were justified and 
proportionate’.78 
4.1.2 Analysis and comparison 
SIAT is one of the transfer pricing cases where it paid a commission fee as 
business expenses to the parent company of its joint subsidiary in 
Luxembourg. In that case, the presumption that each and every time the 
taxpayer pays to foreign affiliate is considered as tax avoidance may always 
be incompatible with the freedom of providing services. This could happen 
because the tax authorities suspect the creation of artificial arrangements 
which do not reflect economic activity. However, obtaining the APA could 
solve this matter as taken place in SIAT case, as long as it is transparent. In 
short, the APA will bring the actual transactions and information of 
economic activity to the tax authorities.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the name of the principle of legal 
certainty, the law has to be stated clearly and publicly. Yet, the problem in P 
Oy case lies under the uncertain circumstances of ‘special reasons’ to grant 
the loss carry forward application. This matter will lead to a higher risk that 
                                                
75 C-311/08, SGI, para. 12. 
76 C-311/08, SGI, para. 3 and 15. 
77 C-311/08, SGI, para. 60, 65 and 69. 
78 C-311/08, SGI, para. 75 and Tom O’Shea, Case Notes on the Direct Tax Jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, p.7. 
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such law favours certain undertakings and may constitute an unlawful state 
aid. 
While for Oy AA and SGI cases, they have different circumstances but 
similar patterns. Either Finnish tax authorities or Belgian authorities argued 
that the restriction of law is needed to tackle the tax avoidance and harmful 
tax competition. This restrictive legislation, which is made by proportionate 
justifications, also creates a clear, transparent and definite rule for the 
taxpayers to follow and be bound by the law. Despite the restrictive tax 
provision will not likely attract Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to their 
territory, yet the Member States could possibly maintain the balance in the 
allocation of taxing rights and protect against the tax avoidance between 
entities resident in one Member State and the related parties established in 
other Member States. 
While compared to the APAs cases explained in the previous section, the 
Member States provide an attractive tax provision by granting the APAs 
requests. However, when the unilateral APAs are granted in inappropriate 
manner and tend to be secrecy from outside but local jurisdictions only, the 
APA itself would never pass the test of proportionality in the case law of the 
court and will lose the legitimate expectations advantage as one of its main 
objectives. Thus, in order to increase the legitimate expectations level of 
APAs, the EC has come with a package of transparency, which will be 
described in the next section.  
4.2.1 ECJ case law in relation to tax low regimes 
ECJ, Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium v. Commission 
(Belgian Coordination Centres) was about a ‘coordination centre’ which 
was created by group of multinational companies aimed to provide services 
in the financial field for those companies; where in 1982, the Belgian 
authority offered a special scheme particularly in the tax sector that was 
beneficial for such centres.79 Some benefits provided were the exemption 
for property tax, the exemption from capital duty and the exemption from 
withholding tax.  
The Commission began the investigation procedure in December 1985, 
followed by the amendments from the Belgian Government in August 1986 
which closed the procedure since the amendments provided the 
compatibility with Article 107 of the TFEU.80 Subsequently, there were 
                                                
79 Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered on 9 February 2006 – Joined Cases C-
182/03 and C-217/03. 
80 2003/755/EC: Commision Decision of 17 February 2003 on the aid scheme implemented 
by Belgium for coordination centres established in Belgium (Text with EEA relevance.) 
(notified under document number C(2003) 564) – official Journal L 282, 30/10/2003 P. 
0025-0045. 
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several communications had been done between the Belgian Authorities and 
the Commission which finally triggered the Commission to ask the 
interested parties to make their comments on the measure known in 2002.  
European Commission, 2006/940/EC, Commission Decision of 19 July 
2006 on aid scheme C3/2006 implemented by Luxembourg for 1929 
holding companies and billionaire holding companies concerned a scheme 
in Luxembourg which exempt the billionaire holding companies from taxes 
under the 1929 Law. The Organic Law of 31 July 1929 introduced a tax 
vehicle which allowed the operating companies in a multinational group to 
distribute the profits while avoid the tax of profits that belongs to the 
beneficiary holding companies and distributed it to the shareholders. Under 
the 1929 Law, those holding companies were not subject to corporate 
income tax (impôt sur le revenu des collectivités), municipal business tax 
(impôt commercial communal) and net worth tax (taxes ur la valeur nette). 
However, they were liable to the taxes on capital, such as the real estate tax 
(impôt foncier) and the annual subscription tax (taxe d’abonnement). 
Dividends, interest, royalties and capital gains were also exempted from the 
1929 holding companies.81  
After several examinations, the Commission decided that the scheme 
constituted aid which was incompatible with the common market in July 
2005.  
The next case was the Grand Chamber Case between the European 
Commission and Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland in joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P. 
The Commission decided to start a formal investigation regarding 
Gibraltar’s two corporate tax measures i.e. ‘exempt companies’ (OJ 2002 C 
26, p.13) and ‘qualifying companies’ (OJ 2002 c 26, p.9) to fulfill the 
requirement of the ‘exempt companies’. 
The criteria formed the assessment which was adopted by the tax system 
that allows some companies to be recognized in order to gain selective 
advantages. In other words, it was characterized as ‘the recipient 
undertakings’, which was a privileged category constituted as favoring 
‘certain’ undertakings within the meaning of the Article 107 (1) TFEU. As 
the matter of fact, the offshore companies, which were group of companies 
based on the assessment adopted in the proposed tax reform, avoided the 
taxation due to their specific characteristic of the group benefited from the 
selectivity advantages. 
                                                
81 2006/940/EC: Commission Decision of 19 July 2006 on aid Scheme C 3/2006 
implemented by Luxembourg for ‘1929’ holding companies and ‘billionaire’ holding 
companies – notified under document number C (2006) 2956).  
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4.2.2 Analysis 
Article 107 (1) of TFEU provides that ‘any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.  
The Commission held the investigations on coordination centres in Belgium 
on the ground that those centres were benefiting specific advantages. This 
happened due to the cost-plus method was only applied to these 
coordination centres and the treatment went beyond the exemptions to all 
firms that were entitled based on the general tax system; which lead to the 
distortion of the competition and adversely affect the fair trade within the 
meaning of article 107 (1) of the TFEU. The coordination scheme was also 
incompatible with the common market since the aid was measured and the 
exceptions provided in Article 107 (2) and (3) of TFEU did not apply.  
The Commission groundwork on the investigations in Luxembourg were 
also based on the Article 107 (2) and (3) of TFEU which put some measures 
that the scheme on Luxembourg constituted an infringement of a fair trade 
between Member States. The competition between Member States would be 
affected by the advantages given to the 1929 holding companies since they 
were treated more favorably than independent service providers and 
financial intermediaries, such as traditional banks and consultancy firms.  
The Commission was aware that some degree of tax competition within the 
European Union may ‘inevitable’ and may contribute to the lower tax 
pressure. Member States are free to choose the tax systems that are 
considered as the most appropriate and under their preferences.82 However, 
the European Union had the urgency to ensure that the competition in the 
common market applied the code designed to encourage foreign 
undertakings or capital (not only to protect domestic). This meant that the 
discrimination was unfavorable to the residents of the Member States in 
order to combat the harmful tax competition. 
Additionally, the State Aid regime was designed to protect the competition 
between undertakings from distortion or intra-community trade that were 
generated by the Member States through the grant of measures favoring 
certain undertakings or goods at the expense of others. It was intended to 
protect the internal market against the segmentation through the state aid 
while, at the same time, provided certainty that there was no unjustified 
                                                
82 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Joined cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, 
para. 125. 
 29 
 
discrimination against the foreign nationals or non-residents as the form of 
protectionism favoring only domestic undertakings or capital.83 
 
 
 
  
                                                
83 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskine, op.cit., para. 133. 
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5 APA and the principle of 
legality 
5.1 The legality issues 
The principle of legality ‘protects the citizen against the arbitrary use of 
power, or, more precisely, it demands a legal basis (which itself must be of a 
certain standard) to legitimize State action’.84 APA’s nature itself is a 
contract between the tax authority and the taxpayer. Thus, it means that 
under the principle of legality, there should not be a creation of private law 
and APA should exist for everyone.85 
In practice, such as in the three abovementioned examples of the APA 
proceedings, the advantages of APAs are described by carrying out the 
negotiation with the tax authorities, granting tax benefits which may not be 
authorized by the law, doing it secretly and no transparency. These acts my 
increase a higher risk of creating the private law, which means particular 
taxpayers that enter into an APA will be privileged under a special law.86 
Yet, all of these activities may infringe the principle of legality.87  
This creation of ‘special legislation’88 to certain taxpayers will lead to the 
question whether the selectivity tax measurement is caught under the article 
107 (1) TFEU. The EC argued that APA constitutes state aid in the current 
pending proceedings by stating the APA that appeared to result in a 
decrease of expenses or underestimate the taxable profit of what should 
normally be borne in the independent transactions between third parties, 
may constitute state aid when the tax ruling is established by providing the 
selectivity advantage to certain companies.89 However, as explained in the 
abovementioned, the nature of APA is a cooperative mechanism between 
the parties to determine the method of transactions and, under the principle 
of legality, the APA should be accessible to everyone.90 This means that the 
argument of infringing the selective tax measurement under the article 107 
(1) TFEU is questionable as the APA is just one of the alternatives to assess 
a tax basis in the tax system. Yet, even though the APA should be accessible 
to everyone and chances should be equal to all taxpayers, as a matter of fact, 
                                                
84 Leonard F.M. Besselink, Frans Pennings, Sacha Prechal, Eclipse of the Legality Principle 
in the European Union, Kluwer 2010. 
85 M.T. Leão, Advance Pricing Agreements and the Principles of Legality and Equality: 
The  Problems Surrounding Contracts in Tax Law, International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
 July/August 2014, p. 261. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., p. 262. 
88 Ibid. 
89 State aid SA.38375 FFT, para. 89. 
90 M.T. Leão, op.cit., p. 259. 
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OECD has also acknowledged that APA may be limited to large taxpayers 
only due to the high administration cost in the process to obtain the APA.91 
Hence, in order to prevent the selectivity advantage within the APA, OECD 
recommends the tax authorities to establish more efficient APA access for 
small and medium enterprises.92 
  
                                                
91 See para. 4.163.of the OECD Guidelines. 
92 Ibid. 
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6 Tax transparency package 
6.1 Understanding today’s tax transparency package 
The EC presented the proposal of tax transparency package on 18 March 
2015 with respect to protect against tax avoidance and harmful tax 
competition in the EU. The main agenda in this package is an introduction 
to a quarter basis of automatically exchanging information between Member 
States to protect their tax bases and prevent the companies which try to 
avoid paying their fair share of taxes.93 
The key component of the tax transparency package is to increase the 
cooperation level between Member States since tax transparency is 
considered as one of the most important ways to tackle the tax avoidance, 
especially in the cross-border transactions. However, Member States have 
difficulties to obtain the information about other Member States’ tax rulings 
due to the confidentiality and secrecy reasons in each Member States.94 
Therefore, this non-transparent situation is frequently being used by 
particular companies to gain the advantage of artificially reducing their tax 
payment.95 The lack of awareness of cross-border tax rulings outside 
Member State’s jurisdiction ‘may impact their own tax bases’.96  
The APAs proceedings outlined in section 3 are good examples on how the 
individual tax rulings could shift the tax liability from one to another 
Member States. The straight tax rulings are considered appropriate for 
attracting the foreign business or investors, yet the preferential treatment in 
tax rulings to particular entities will harm the tax competition and encourage 
the companies to avoid paying their fair share of taxes.97 
Thus, the automatic exchange of information will facilitate those matters 
where every Member States will aware on any cross-border tax rulings 
within the EU due to Member States would have no option to refuse or 
reduce the information based on the reasons of ‘commercial secrecy or 
public policy’.98  
The lists below are the standard information to be provided by every 
Member States in their quarterly reports on tax rulings: 
“a. Name of taxpayer and group (where this applies); 
                                                
93 EC Press release, Combating tax avoidance, op.cit., as accessed on 17 May 2015. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 European Commission – Fact Sheet, Combating corporate tax avoidance: Commission 
presents Tax Transparency, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4609_en.htm, 
as accessed on 17 May 2015. 
98 Ibid. 
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b. A description of the issues addressed in the tax ruling; 
c. A description of the criteria used to determine an APA; 
d. Identification of the Member State(s) most likely to be affected; 
e. Identification of any other taxpayer likely to be affected (apart from 
natural persons)” 99 
As for the transparency package, the EC decided to repeal the Savings 
Taxation Directive, which was adopted in March 2014, in order to make the 
package becomes more efficient.100 The Savings Taxation Directive limited 
the scope to only automatically exchange the information in relation to 
savings-related income.101 Meanwhile, in December 2014, the EC proposed 
an amendment of the Administrative Cooperation Directive (Council 
Directive 2014/107/EU amending Directive 2011/16/EU) which would 
ensure that ‘Member States automatically exchange the full spectrum of 
financial information from 2017’.102 
  
                                                
99 European Commission – Fact Sheet, Combating corporate tax avoidance, op.cit. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
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7 Final Remarks 
APAs are one of many instruments to attract foreign investors to carry out 
their business in the Member States’ territory. The objectives of APAs such 
as ‘increasing the level of certainty for the taxpayers involved and a 
reduction in economic or juridical double taxation for the MNE group’103 
become the reasons of why the taxpayers will to file an APA request to the 
tax administrations, despite the length and the high costs that may occur in 
the process of obtaining APA. 
Yet, APAs are not free from issues or problems arose, especially in relation 
to the disruption of the harmony in the internal market within the EU. That 
problem, in this case is the unilateral APAs, is implemented in the unlawful 
way and receives preferential tax treatment that may lead to the state aid 
infringement in the meaning of EU rules. The main reason is the Member 
State’ tax authorities concludes the unilateral APAs without any binding to 
the counterpart tax jurisdictions and thus, on the ground of commercial 
secrecy, the tax ruling taken place remains secret inside the local tax 
jurisdiction. Certainly, without the transparency and/or the simplicity in 
exchanging the information between Member States, one Member State 
which concludes unilateral APA could shift the tax liability and lead to 
serious revenue losses to other Member States.104 
All of the abovementioned matters cause the unilateral APAs becoming 
unaccountable and losing the legitimate expectations advantage for the 
taxpayers. Also, as explained in the previous section, the Oy AA and SGI 
cases are good examples of the law restriction yet clear and transparent, thus 
the restriction is considered proportionate. However, the opposite of the 
unilateral APAs proceedings, the certainty of rules is vanished due to the 
non-transparent APAs and when the APA is classified, it will never pass the 
proportionality test.  
Moreover, the selectivity economic advantage that is provided by Member 
States to particular taxpayers in granting the APA request infringes the EU 
state aid rules. The APA brings the legitimate expectations to the taxpayers, 
while on the other hand it may breach the EU rules if the Member States 
accept APA request on purely discretionary exercise of authorization. This 
matter also makes the usefulness of APA be limited due to its legality issues 
where, under the principle of legality, there should not be a creation of 
private law and APA should exist for everyone. 
                                                
103 See para 4.147 of the OECD Guidelines.  
104 EC – Fact Sheet, op.cit. 
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Thus, to answer the critical needs of tax transparency within the EU, the EC 
has presented the tax transparency package and amended the Administration 
Cooperative Directive. When the package is enforced on 1 January 2016105, 
all the Member States will have to enclose their tax rulings on a quarterly 
basis. This step will increase the awareness on any cross-border tax rulings 
within the EU and which rulings have impact to their tax base territory. 
Also, these actions of increasing tax transparency by the EC are in line with 
the Action Plan 13 of OECD’s BEPS project. Action Plan 13 provides a 
guidance on publishing transfer pricing documentation and country-by-
country reporting which includes the master file, local file and country-by-
country report.  
With the publication requirement in the automatic exchange of information, 
the unilateral APAs will gain the legitimate expectations back for the 
taxpayers and protect against the harmful tax competition. The requirement 
of three transfer pricing reports as mentioned in the Action Plan 13 will also 
provide the information of cross-border transactions between associated 
enterprises to the relevant tax jurisdictions involved and thus will assist to 
tackle the BEPS problem in the EU. 
  
                                                
105 EC Press Release, Combating tax avoidance, op.cit. 
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